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INTRODUCTION 
Carpenter's Brief contains little of substance that need be addressed by the Turrells . 
. However, Carpenter does make two misstatements about the evidence at trial, which the Turrells 
believe should be debunked at the outset of their Reply Brief. 
First, Carpenter's claims that a "disinterested witness, David Bonder," corroborated his 
testimony about his supposed bailment contract with Herbert Turrell, thus making the application 
ofidaho's Dead Man's Statute irrelevant or the trial court's ruling on that issue harmless error. 
(Respondent's Brief ("RB"), p 8, 9). In truth, Mr. Bonder did not corroborate Carpenter's 
testimony on any point material to the existence of the contract he alleges. To the contrary, Mr. 
Bonder highlighted why the Dead Man's Statute should be applied in this case. Mr. Bonder did 
not testify as to who owned the buildings or support Carpenter's testimony that they had first 
tried to place the buildings on Carpenter's property before moving them to the Turrells' land. 
Instead, Mr. Bonder simply testified that he helped move the buildings from a location on Seltice 
Way to Herbert Turrell's property (Tr 89, L 8-15), never suggesting that they moved the 
buildings to the Turrell property because they could not get them on to Carpenter's. Most 
importantly, Mr. Bonder emphatically said that he was not privy to any conversation with 
Herbert Turrell about the buildings (Tr 91, L 23). 
Nothing Mr. Bonder said "corroborated" Carpenter's version of his alleged arrangement 
with Herbert in the slightest. Instead, Mr. Bonder's testimony was entirely consistent with what 
all other facts suggested - that Herbert had simply purchased the buildings, by trade or cash, from 
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Carpenter and naturally would not have objected when they were moved to his property. 1 
Carpenter's only evidence that he stiJI owned the buildings, did not sell or trade them to Herbert, 
and was storing them for years on the Turrells' property by agreement with Herbert was his own 
testimony, testimony that Herbert could not rebut by the time Carpenter first voiced his claim in 
court. 
Second, Carpenter's repeated suggestion that the trust was not valid or effective because 
it was not registered with the court in Kootenai County is dead wrong as a matter of law (RB, p. 
5, 7, I!). The record is clear that all pertinent trust related documents, including a Statement of 
Registration, were prepared by legal counsel, executed by the Turrells, and recorded with the 
Recorder's Office in 1993 (Exhibits H- N). Regardless of what the practice may have been for 
registering such trusts in Kootenai County 15 years ago ( an issue Carpenter ignores), the Turrells 
clearly relying on legal counsel believed they had complied with the law. Moreover, a failure to 
properly register the trust, whether technical or not, does not in any way affect the validity of the 
trust agreement or the trust itself(IC § 15-7-107).2 
ARGUMENT 
A. The Dead Man's Statute Should Apply. Carpenter's arguments as to why the IC § 
9-202(3) is inapplicable are difficult to follow and do not begin to address any of the points 
1 Carpenter did nothing to docnment his continued ownership or to insure that the family of a man he knew was in 
failing health understood that the buildings were simply being stored until Carpenter could find a buyer. Instead, he 
left the buildings sit amid a field of other junk for almost 4 years without doing anything to confirm his ownership or 
arrangement with Herbe1t even after Herbert died. The facts probably create a presumption of ownership in Herbert 
(Paine v. Strom, 51 Idaho 532,537 (1931)). 
2 Similarly, no Idaho law requires the registration to be amended any time a trustee is substituted as Carpenter 
repeatedly asserts. 
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raised by the Turrells in the opening argument of their Brief. Carpenter begins by making the 
fallacious assertion that Tim Turrell could not be a successor trustee since the trust was not 
registered. He then simply regurgitates the very legal conclusions made by the trial court about 
the need for a formal probate proceeding before § 9-202(3) comes into play without citing any 
authority or addressing any of the Turrells' arguments. Carpenter then follows with mythical 
claims about the corroborative value of Mr. Bouder's testimony and a thoroughly puzzling 
suggestion that the Turrells should have sued Herbert's estate or the trust for some unfathomable 
reason rather than defending themselves. Carpenter then loops back to his claims about the 
formalities of probating an estate and registering a trust, ending by returning to the argument Mr. 
Bouden's testimony independently established a gratuitous bailment, thus making any trial court 
error about the application of§ 9-202(3) harmless. 
Lost in Carpenter's words is any focus on the issues raised by the Turrells - is the 
application of the Dead Man's Statute limited to situations where a personal representative is 
formally appointed by a court or, as logic dictates, does its protection extend to the modem 
personal representative who is appointed upon death of the settlor to manage the affairs of the 
decedent who placed his estate in trust or who acts under the auspices of the Small Estates 
Administration Act? Nothing Carpenter relates in this brief addresses either side of that issue. 
B. Tim Turrell Was A Personal Representative. Carpenter misinterprets the Turrells' 
Brief to create a reply to their argument that that Tim Turrell should be protected if§ 9-202(3) 
extends to more than just formally appointed executors and administrators. Completely at odds 
with what the Turrells actually said, Carpenter asserts that the Turrells argue that the trial court 
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did not have any evidence "Tim had not been appointed by the Court in a formal probate 
proceeding" (RB, p. 10). Since that is not what the Turrells said, very little need be raised in 
reply. 
The Turrells concede (and never claimed) that Tim was ever been formally appointed by 
a court to any position relative to his father's estate. Instead, their argument as is clear in their 
Brief is that Tim Turrell acted in a representative capacity and should receive the same 
protection as if a formal probate proceeding existed. The Turrells contend that Tim Turrell was 
acting as the personal representative of his father's estate and as successor trustee by the 
unchallenged agreement of his family and should therefore be protected under§ 9-202(3). 
Alternatively, Tim Turrell was, as the trial court found, an agent of his mother, who was, as the 
trial court also found and as Herbert's will and trust so speak, the first named personal 
representative and surviving trustee. As an agent of the person who was clearly the personal 
representative of Herbert's estate, Tim Turrell should logically receive the same protection as his 
mother would have.3 
As before, Carpenter did not give any reason or authority as to why the Turrells are 
wrong. 
C. "Backdooring" the Dead Man's Statute. Without citing a single apposite case or 
addressing even one point raised by the Turrells about the trial court's conclusion a plaintiff can 
avoid § 9-202(3) by simply alleging he is suing the personal representative in his individual 
3 An agent should recrive the same protection under§ 9-202(3) as Iris principal. Otherwise, anyone acting on 
behalf of, or at the direction of, a personal representative (including employees of a corporate personal 
representative) could be held liable in a case such as tlris for conversion when their principal could not. 
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capacity, Carpenter simply rehashes his arguments about formal probates, court appointments 
and legally incorrect assertion that Tim Turrell was required by Idaho law to register his 
appointment as successor trustee. Carpenter simply makes no effort to explain why someone 
who could not be permitted to testify because of the proscription of§ 9-202(3) in an action 
against the personal representative of an estate would be entitled to testify as to an agreement he 
had with the decedent by simply claiming he was suing the personal representative in his 
individual capacity or by suing an agent of the representative or an heir of the estate to whom the 
property at issue ( or its proceeds) was distributed. 
D. Immediate Possession Is A Relevant (And Missing) Element. The fact that the 
case of Luzar v. Western Surety Co., 107 Idaho 693,696 (1984) did not involve a bailment 
. contract, gratuitous or otherwise, is as meaningless as Carpenter's argument that the Turrells 
have not cited any authority "which would deny a bailor immediate possession of his property 
from a bailee in a gratuitous bailment situation" misses the mark. 
The right to immediate possession is an essential element of the tort of conversion 
(Forbush v. San Diego Fruit & Produce Co., 46 Idaho 231, 243 (1928); Portland Seed Co, v. 
Clark, 35 Idaho 44, 46 (1922), not just an element of cases involving collateral pledges. To hold 
otherwise would mean that a person who was not entitled to possession could nevertheless sue to 
recover possession or damages as to property he was not entitled to possess. Accordingly, to 
recover conversion damages against an agent of a principal who had possession of the property 
in issue a plaintiff must prove that he had a right to possession superior to that of the principal 
(Restatement ofT01is 2nd, § 233(1)). 
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The issue here is also not whether a bailor in a gratuitous bailment relationship is entitled 
as a general principal to "immediate possession" from the bailee, but whether Carpenter under 
the facts of this case was entitled to possession of the buildings superior to that of the estate of 
Herbert Turrell at time they were sold by Tim Turrell. Obviously, the Turrells do not argue or 
suggest that as an abstract principal of law a bailor in a gratuitous bailment arrangement does not 
have an immediate right to secure possession of his property from the bailee. Of course, he does. 
That, however, does not answer the issue presented. 
A fundamental prerequisite to a right to possession in a case such as this is ownership of 
the buildings. If Carpenter owned the buildings as he alleges, the personal property deed 
executed by the Turrells did not convey title to the trust (Exhibit M). Whether that deed could 
effectively convey after acquired property or not, the deed could not convey title to property 
neither Herbert nor his wife owned. Since Carpenter admits that Marian was not involved in his 
arrangement with Herbert (RB, p. 3, 14), Herbert's estate was in possession of the buildings 
when they were sold. To get possession of the buildings, Carpenter would have had to file suit 
against the estate if a demand for their return had been made and rejected. To prove ownership, 
Carpenter would have to testify in that action as to the details of his arrangement with Herbert -
that Herbert was holding the buildings at Carpenter's pleasure and not as the owner. Since he 
was the only surviving witness to his alleged arrangement with Herbert, Carpenter's testimony 
would unquestionably be barred by § 9-202(3). He thus could not prove the bailment contract 
and consequently his ownership of the buildings. Carpenter could not then establish his right to 
immediate possession or the buildings. 
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Whether ornot Tim Turrell was a personal representative within the meaning of§ 9-
202(3), he was undeniably acting as an agent of that estate since there is no evidence of any kind 
that Tim Turrell benefited personally from the sale. He therefore carmot be held liable for selling 
something that Carpenter did not have a legal right to recover from Herbert's estate. 
E. Breach of Contract and Negligence. Carpenter concedes in his Brief that the sole 
theory on which the trial court awarded judgment in his favor was conversion. The Tnrrells 
raised the issue because the decision of the trial comi was unclear. With Carpenter's concession, 
the arguments made by the Turrells are moot. 
F. The Judgment Against Mrs. Turrell Is Improper. Carpenter presents arguments 
that do not change the fact that the judgment as entered against Peggy Turrell is improper. 
Initially, the suggestion that "this Court must proceed on the assumption that the Defendant's 
Acts benefited the community and in turn Peggy Turrell" finds absolutely no support anywhere 
in the record. Tim'Turrell testified that the proceeds of the sales were deposited in the trust 
banking account (Tr 141, L 8) a claim that was completely unchallenged by Carpenter at any 
relevant time. 
More importantly, however, whether or not Tim Turrell committed a tort that benefited 
the community, the judgment as entered is against Mrs. Turrell individually. As such, Carpenter 
could execute on her separate property, not just her interest in community property owned with 
her husband. Carpenter does not address that fact, but by his arguments apparently concedes that 
he would not be entitled to do so because Peggy Turrell was admittedly not a joint tortfeasor. 
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G. Carpenter Is Not Entitled To Fees On Appeal. Should this Court disagree with 
the arguments raised by the Turrells, Carpenter is not entitled to recover fees he incurred in 
defending the judgment entered by the trial court. Contrary to Carpenter's arguments, the 
Turrells have not challenged one factual finding of the trial court. The Turrells instead challenge 
the trial court's legal conclusions based on the facts as it found them and specifically argue in 
good faith for a logical extension of existing law. 
In order to support an award of fees because a defense was frivolous or without 
foundation, a court must affirmatively find that the argument of counsel is "not supported in fact 
or warranted under existing law and caunot be supported by a good faith argument for an 
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law (Hanfv. Syringa Realty, Inc., 120 Idaho 364, 
369-370 (1991)). In this case, no such showing can be (or has been) made. 
Respectful! y submitted 
Dated: / /5 /4 '7 
~ I Dean &Kolts 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 5th day of January 2009, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
James A. Raeon 
Attorney at Law 
1424 Sherman Avenue Suite 300 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814 
IZI U.S.MAIL 
D FEDEX GROUND 
D HAND DELIVERED 
0 OVERNIGHT MAIL 
D FACSIMILE 
Charles R. Dean, Jr. 
